In this paper, we analyze the security of cryptosystems using short generators over ideal lattices such as candidate multilinear maps by Garg, Gentry and Halevi and fully homomorphic encryption by Smart and Vercauteren. Our approach is based on a recent work by Cramer, Ducas, Peikert and Regev on analysis of recovering a short generator of an ideal in the q-th cyclotomic field for a prime power q. In their analysis, implicit lower bounds of the special values of Dirichlet L-functions at 1 are essentially used for estimating some sizes of the dual basis in the log-unit lattice of the q-th cyclotomic field.
Introduction
In recent years, lattice-based cryptography has been paid much attention to as a candidate of post-quantum cryptography. Ideal lattices are in a special class of lattices corresponding to ideals in rings of the form Z[x]/(f (x)) for some irreducible polynomials f (x), such as f (x) = x n + 1 for a 2-power integer n > 1 (e.g. see [35] for details). In cryptography, ideal lattices have been used as powerful tools to construct a number of efficient and secure cryptosystems, mainly including public key encryption schemes [45, 46] , hash functions [33, 37, 41] and digital signatures [32, 34] . Recently, ideal lattices have been applied to construct encryption schemes with high functionality. In 2009, Gentry [21] first proposed a construction of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) using ideal lattices. After Gentry's breakthrough, a number of variants of Gentry's original FHE scheme have been proposed (in particular, variants of [22, 47] are based on ideal lattices). In 2013, Garg, Gentry and Halevi [20] first proposed a candidate of multilinear maps from ideal lattices, called the GGH scheme. In 2014, Langlois, Stehlé and Steinfeld [27] improved the GGH scheme for both efficiency and security, and their scheme is called GGHLite (see also [3] for implementation of GGHLite).
For a 2-power integer n > 1, let K = Q(ζ 2n ) be the 2n-th cyclotomic field and O K = Z[ζ 2n ] ≃ Z[x]/(x n + 1) its ring of integers, where ζ m denotes a primitive m-th root of unity for an integer m > 2. In the cryptographic constructions of [20, 27, 47] , a certain 'short' element g ∈ O K is used as a secret key. In contrast, some Z-basis of the principal ideal (g), such as the Hermite normal form HNF(g), is used as a public key (e.g. see [13, Section 4] for the definition of HNF(g)). Therefore a part of the security of schemes of [20, 27, 47] relies on the computational hardness of the following problem, introduced in [15, Section 1]:
Problem 1 (Short Generator of a Principal Ideal Problem, SG-PIP) Let K be a number field and O K its ring of integers. Let g be a short element of O K . Given a Z-basis of the principal ideal (g), the problem is to find g itself or a sufficiently short element g ′ ∈ O K satisfying (g ′ ) = (g).
This problem can be divided into the following two problems:
-Principal Ideal Problem (PIP): Given a Z-basis of the principal ideal I = (g), find a generator h of I.
-Short Generator Problem (SGP):
Given a generator h of I, recover g itself or a sufficiently short generator g ′ of I.
Recent Progress for PIP and SGP
There are several classes of efficient algorithms for PIP over number fields of large degree in both classical and quantum computing models [7-10, 12, 24] . In [24] , Hallgren proposed a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for PIP over number fields of small degree. Biasse and Fieker [7] first proposed a subexponential algorithm for an arbitrary class of number fields under the generalized Riemann hypothesis (see also [8] ). For security analysis of cryptosystems of [20, 27, 47] , we focus on PIP over cyclotomic fields. For 2 k -th cyclotomic fields, Campbell, Groves and Shepherd [12] claimed that there is a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for PIP, although their claim has not been proved yet. Recently, Biasse [9] announced the same claim as Campbell et al.'s one. In a classical computing model, Biasse [10] also presented a heuristic algorithm to solve PIP over 2 k -th cyclotomic fields in time 2 N 2/3+ϵ for N = 2 k and arbitrarily small ϵ > 0. As for SGP, Bernstein [6] first pointed out that SGP over (2 k -th) cyclotomic fields is reduced to a closest vector problem (CVP) over the log-unit lattice, which is obtained by the logarithmic embedding. Similar attacks are also sketched by B := {b j := Log((ζ 
Our Contributions
Our contributions of this paper are as follows: j ∥ are explicit for any fixed k. Specifically, our bounds imply that the success probability of their attack becomes much higher for q = 2 k with k ≥ 11.
• Experimental Verification: By experiments, we verify the effectiveness of the RSG attack against cryptosystems of [20, 27, 47] for q = 2 k and 6 ≤ k ≤ 10 (Section 8 below). In particular, the RSG attack can recover the secret key g with probability being about 50 % (resp. 85 % and 100 %) when k = 6 (resp. k = 8 and k = 10). Our experiments also show that the success probability of their attack is independent of distributions for generating keys in cryptosystems of [20, 27, 47] (e.g. uniformly random and discrete Gaussian distributions).
Recall that the security of cryptosystems of [20, 27, 47] is based on the difficulty of Problem 1 (SG-PIP), which can be divided into two problems PIP and SGP. By combining our theoretical and experimental results, we expect that SGP over 2 k -th cyclotomic fields in cryptosystems of [20, 27, 47] could be solved by the RSG attack if k ≥ 10, under the assumption that Weber's class number problem holds true. Note that k ≥ 10 is required for high security (e.g. 80-bit security) of these cryptosystems. Thereby, the security of these cryptosystems relies only on the difficulty of PIP.
Mathematical Background
In this section, we prepare mathematical notation for our later discussion. Let N, Z, R and C be the set of positive integers, the ring of integers, the field of real numbers and the field of complex numbers, respectively. We denote by ⟨·, ·⟩ and ∥ · ∥ the natural inner product and the Euclidean norm on C n , respectively.
We also denote column vectors by lower-case bold letters (e.g. b) and matrices by upper-case bold letters (e.g. B). The symbol #S stands for the cardinality of a set S. For non-negative functions f and g on a set X, we write
if the implied constant depends on ϵ.
Lattices and CVP
A lattice L is a discrete additive subgroup of a finite dimensional R-vector space 
, where δ ij is the Kronecker delta given by δ ij = 1 (resp. δ ij = 0) if i = j (resp. otherwise). In other words,
Given a lattice L ⊂ R
n with basis B and a target vector t ∈ R n ∖ L, the closest vector problem (CVP) is to find a lattice vector v ∈ L closest to t. An efficient approach for CVP is the round-off algorithm proposed by Babai [4] . The round-off algorithm for B and t outputs B · ⌊(B ∨ ) t · t⌉ ∈ L, where the rounding function ⌊c⌉ := ⌊c + This lemma is a key for solving SGP by the RSG attack (see Section 4).
Log-Unit Lattice and Cyclotomic Units
For an integer q > 2, let ζ q ∈ C be a primitive q-th root of unity. Then the field
is the ring of integers of K. For any σ ∈ Gal(K/Q), we have σ(ζ q ) = ζ j q for some j ∈ Z with gcd(j, q) = 1 since σ(ζ q ) is also a primitive root of unity. In other words, we have
. From now on we fix an enumeration G ∼ = {1, · · · , φ(q)/2} and define the logarithmic embedding of K × by Log : 
. The group C of cyclotomic units is defined as
In general, it may not be easy to compute generators of C. However, when q = p 
Dirichlet Characters and Dirichlet L-functions
Let G be a finite abelian group. The character group of G, denoted by G, is the set of group homomorphisms from G to C × . It is easy to see that G becomes a group with the pointwise product. There is a non-canonical group isomorphism between G and G, and hence #G = # G.
Let us introduce Dirichlet characters and Dirichlet L-functions (e.g. see [16, 40] ). For q ∈ N, we consider the group (Z/qZ)
× . An element χ ∈ (Z/qZ) × is called a Dirichlet character (or character) modulo q. The character χ is naturally extended to a multiplicative functionχ on N by
The conductor f χ of χ is defined as the minimal positive divisor d of q such that χ factors through some Dirichlet character χ ′ modulo d, that is, we have
We denote by χ * the Dirichlet character modulo f χ inducing χ. We call χ primitive if f χ is exactly equal to q. Notice that χ * is primitive. The character χ is called even (resp. odd ) if χ(−1) = 1 (resp. χ(−1) = −1), and χ is called
The defining series converges absolutely on the region Re(s) > 1. If χ is nontrivial, the series L(s, χ) converges on the region Re(s) > 0. It is well-known that L(s, χ) has a meromorphic continuation to the whole plane C. Further, its only possible pole s = 1 is simple and occurs only when χ is trivial. We have the relation
for any non-trivial character χ modulo q, where p runs over all prime divisors of q such that p ∤ f χ . By (2), we have easily the following.
Lemma 3. Let χ be a Dirichlet character modulo q.
The following are equivalent.
The set of all prime divisors of f χ is equal to that of all prime divisors of q.

In particular, we have L(s, χ) = L(s, χ
* ) if q is a prime power and χ is nontrivial.
Relation between Lower Bounds and Zeros of L-functions
In this subsection, we review upper and lower bounds of L(1, χ) for non-trivial Dirichlet characters χ, and describe a reason why we have not reached the lower bound
As for upper bounds, we have the following easily.
Theorem 1. ([16, (13) in p.96]) For any non-trivial Dirichlet character χ modulo q, the estimate
holds with the implied constant independent of χ and q.
As for lower bounds, we need to consider the influence of a possible real zero of L(s, χ) near to 1. The following gives the definition of a Siegel zero.
Theorem 2. ([16, p.93])
There exists a constant C > 0 such that for any non-trivial Dirichlet char
- acter χ modulo q, L(s, χ) does not vanish if s = σ + √ −1t (σ, t ∈ R) is contained in the region σ > 1 − C log{q(1 + |t|)} except for at most one real number β = β χ ∈ (1− C log{q(1+|t|)} , 1). We call the region a zero-free region of L(s, χ). Such a possible real zero β for L(s, χ) is called a Siegel zero (cf. [39, Chapter 2]).
The Siegel zero β of L(s, χ) does not exist when a non-trivial character χ is not quadratic.
Siegel zeros are not on the vertical strip Re(s) = 1/2 contrary to the generalized Riemann hypothesis. The Siegel zero of L(s, χ) is related to lower bounds of L(1, χ) as follows.
Theorem 3. ([26]) For any non-trivial Dirichlet character χ modulo q, we have
Here the implied constant is independent of χ and q. In particular, the inequality as above holds if χ is not quadratic.
The existence of Siegel zeros is a deep problem in number theory as it influences a distribution of zeros of L(s, χ) and lower bounds of L(1, χ).
We have not reached the non-existence of Siegel zeros for Dirichlet L-functions yet. As for quadratic characters, the best lower bound of L(1, χ) for quadratic characters χ is currently known as Siegel's theorem [44] . We refer to [16, Chapter 21] 
The primitivity of χ in Siegel's theorem can be easily dropped out by
We remark that the constant C ϵ is ineffective since it may depend on a possible Siegel zero β ∈ (1 − ϵ, 1). Siegel's theorem can be applied to the following two number theoretical problems. First, the class number h K of an imaginary quadratic field K goes to infinity as the absolute value d K of the discriminant of K/Q tends to infinity. Second, the asymptotics log
It is a spacial case of the Brauer-Siegel theorem (cf. [30] ). By this asymptotics, there exist finitely many imaginary quadratic fields K such that h K = n for any given n ∈ N.
Later, an effective version of Siegel's theorem was given by Tatuzawa [48] with the implied constant effective for any quadratic character χ except for at most one ineffective quadratic character. Although Tatuzawa's theorem was made explicit by [30] except for one quadratic character, the exceptional one is still ineffective.
In Sections 5 and 6 below, we will give explicit upper and lower bounds of L(1, χ) for any non-trivial even Dirichlet characters χ modulo any prime power.
Cryptosystems Using Short Generators
As mentioned in Section 1, the security of some cryptosystems [20, 27, 47] relies on the computational hardness of finding a short generator of a principal ideal of a number field from a Z-basis of the ideal. This problem is called the Short Generator of a Principal Ideal Problem (SG-PIP). In this section, we briefly give a relation between these cryptosystems and SG-PIP. These cryptosystems are constructed over the ring R = Z[x]/(x n + 1) for a given degree parameter n of the form n = 2 k−1 (k > 1).
Smart-Vercauteren FHE Scheme
We explain the somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) proposed by Smart and Vercautern [47] , which is integrated to the fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) using the bootstrapping. The key generation of the SHE scheme over R is as follows:
, and take the unique root α ∈ F p of D(x).
Apply the XGCD-algorithm over
. Then the public key is pk = (p, α), and the secret key is sk = (p, B).
The ideal p = (p, x − α) of R is constructed from pk, and its Hermite normal form (HNF) is given by 
By the construction, p is a principal ideal generated by G(x) ∈ R. As mentioned in [47] , sk can be recovered from the inverse of a small generator of p (since η ≪ p). Hence, recovering sk from pk is an instance of SG-PIP.
GGH and GGHLite Schemes
We explain the miltilinear map (GGH scheme) proposed by Garg et al. [20] and its improved version called GGHLite [27] . Let D Z,σ denote the discrete Gaussian distribution over Z with standard deviation σ > 0. In the GGH scheme, a secret
√ n·σ is additionally required for the construction of the GGHLite scheme [27] . Moreover, given a modulus parameter q > 0, a secret element z is randomly sampled from R q = R/qR. In both the GGH and the GGHLite schemes, the pair (g, z) gives a secret key.
The zeroizing attack, which was first introduced in [20] tries to recover a basis B of the ideal I = (g) from given public parameters such as several encoding of zero and one (See [13, Section 5.1] for details). Therefore, recovering g or a short element g ′ from the basis B is an instance of SG-PIP (as mentioned in [13, 4 is sufficient to attack the GGH scheme).
Overview of Cramer et al.'s Analysis for SGP
In this section, we briefly review Cramer et al.'s analysis for SGP (defined in Section 1) and give some remarks on their attack.
Attack Algorithm
For a prime power q = p k , we use the same notation such as G = (Z/qZ) × /{±1}, the log-unit lattice Λ and the group C of cyclotomic units of the q-th cyclotomic field K = Q(ζ q ) described in Subsection 2.2. For the canonical generator {b j } j∈G∖{1} of C, set
for j ∈ G ∖ {1}. Note that {b j } j∈G∖{1} is a basis of Log(C) by Lemma 2. Let g ∈ O K be a short element as in Problem 1. Given a generator h of the principal ideal I = (g), SGP is to find g itself or a sufficiently short generator of I. Since both g and h are generators of I, we have h = ug for some u ∈ O × K , and Log(h) = Log(g) + Log(u) with Log(u) ∈ Λ = Log(O × K ). In order to recover Log(u) from Log(h), the RSG attack aims to represent
by using the basis {b j } j∈G∖{1} of Log(C). For the representation (4), Cramer et al. first assume that the Log(C) is exactly equal to the log-unit lattice Λ:
Moreover, the RSG attack algorithm assumes the following (see [15, 
1. Apply Babai's round-off algorithm to B := {b j } j∈G∖{1} and t := Log(h) = Log(u) + Log(g). 
] .
This implies that the success probability, that is Pr
, is at least α for the distribution D satisfying Assumption 2.
Remark 1. Since [Λ : Log(C)] = h + (q), Assumption 1 is related to mathematical problems on h + (q). In particular, when q is 2-power, Assumption 1 is equivalent to Weber's class number problem (i.e. h + (q) = 1 for all 2-power q). In Appendix A below, we will give several results related to Weber's class number problem.
Some Remarks
In the first step of Algorithm 1, we are able to compute v = Log(u) by Lemma 1 if the condition
is satisfied. In this case, we have u ′ ∈ C satisfying Log(u ′ ) = Log(u) in the second step of Algorithm 1. This implies that u ′ has the form ±ζ Let q = p k be a prime power and set G = (Z/qZ) × /{±1}. Then G is identified with the group of all even Dirichlet characters modulo q. We set
Then, ∥b ∨ j ∥ has the following expression in terms of Dirichlet L-functions.
Proposition 1. ([15, Lemma 3.2 and Corollary 3.4]) We have
In particular, ||b 
Explicit Lower Bound of L(1, χ * )
We give explicit lower bounds of L(1, χ * ) = L(1, χ) for any non-trivial even Dirichlet characters χ modulo q = p k . The evenness of χ is needed for attacks for SGP. We show propositions for the cases of p = 2, p ≡ 3 (mod 4), and p ≡ 1 (mod 4), respectively.
Proposition 2 (Case p = 2). Let q = 2 k with k ≥ 3. Let χ be a non-trivial character modulo q. If χ is not quadratic, we have
.
If χ is even and quadratic, we have
Proof. The first assertion is obvious from [31, Corollary 2] . The second assertion is also obvious since χ is the unique even quadratic character with f χ = 8. □
For any odd prime number p, let χ p be the primitive quadratic character modulo p. Then, there exists a unique quadratic character modulo p k , and such a unique quadratic character is induced by χ p . Notice that χ p is even if and only if p ≡ 1 (mod 4). ≡ 3 (mod 4) ). Let p be a prime number such that p ≡ 3 (mod 4) and let q = p k with k ≥ 1. Then, for any non-trivial even character χ modulo q, we have
Proposition 3 (Case p
Proof. Since the unique quadratic character modulo p k is odd, we obtain the assertion by [31, Corollary 2] . □
Proposition 4 (Case p ≡ 1 (mod 4)). Let p be a prime number such that p ≡ 1 (mod 4) and let q = p k with k ≥ 1. Let χ be a non-trivial character modulo q. If χ is not quadratic, we have
In particular, the esimtate above holds for any quadratic χ if k χ ≥ m(p) with
where k χ is the number such that f χ = p kχ . Furthermore, if χ is quadratic, we have
Proof. 
and the class number formula for Q( √ p), we have the trivial lower bound
This completes the proof. □ 
The second assertion of Proposition 4 is not conditional if m(p) ≤ 1. Here is a table of L(1, χ p ) and m(p) for
if we determine all values of χ p (cf. [16, p.9, (9)]).
Explicit Upper Bound of L(1, χ * )
We have explicit upper bounds of L(1, χ * ) = L(1, χ) for non-trivial even Dirichlet characters χ. On the contrary to the lower bound, we can state the proposition for any prime power as follows.
Proposition 5.
Let χ be a non-trivial even Dirichlet character modulo a prime power q = p k . When p = 2 and k ≥ 3, we have
When p = 3, we have
where k χ is the number such that f χ = p kχ . When p ≥ 5, we have
Summary of this section
Our contribution of this section is to give explicit upper and lower bounds of L(1, χ * ) = L(1, χ) for any non-trivial even Dirichlet characters χ, as in Propositions 2, 3, 4 and 5, contrary to the implicit bounds (1) used in [15] . Moreover, we remark that our upper and lower bounds of L(1, χ * ) are computable. As for lower bounds, we give the trivial lower bound of L(1, χ * ) for quadratic Dirichlet characters χ in order to avoid the ineffectiveness of Siegel's theorem. The upper and lower bounds of L(1, χ * ) as above will be used in Section 6.
Theoretical Estimation of ∥b
For any prime number p and k ∈ N, set q = p k and G = (Z/qZ) × /{±1}. In this section we give theoretical upper and lower bounds of ||b ∨ j || 2 = E(q) (see Proposition 1). In order to divide the sum E(q) in terms of the conductor f χ , we count the number of even Dirichlet characters of conductor p j . 
Lemma 4. Let
When p is odd, we have
Proof. Let χ be a Dirichlet character modulo q = p k . Then χ is even if and only if so is χ * because of χ(−1) = χ * (−1). Thus N (p j ) for j ≥ 3 is evaluated as
In the same way, we have N (2) = N ( 2 2 
When p ≡ 3 (mod 4), we have
3. When p ≡ 1 (mod 4), we have
and the following computable estimate
Proof. When p = 2 and k ≥ 3, we have
Combining this with Proposition 2 and Lemma 4, the right-hand side is majorized by
which is evaluated as 400
This completes the proof for p = 2. The second, third and the fourth inequalities are proved in the same way as in the case of p = 2, using Propositions 3 and 4 in place of Proposition 2; we note that there is no even quadratic Dirichlet character modulo q = p k when p ≡ 3 (mod 4). □ Explicit lower bounds of E(q) are given as follows.
Theorem 6. Let p be a prime number and q
When p ≥ 5, we have
Proof. Consider the case p = 2. By Lemma 4 and Proposition 5, we have
and hence the assertion for p = 2 follows. We obtain the assertions for any odd p in a similar fashion by virtue of Proposition 5 and Lemma 4. □ As in the following corollary, our explicit estimates in Theorems 5 and 6 give the same asymptotic estimate ||b
Corollary 1.
Let q = p k be a prime power. Then, we have
where the implied constant is effective and independent of p and k.
Remark 3.
Note that the implied constant in the upper bound as above is effective. By Corollary 1, we see that E(q) → 0 as k → ∞ for any prime number p. It suggests that the success condition of Algorithm 1 tends to hold as k is larger.
7 Table and 
Here, we set
Here are Table 1 and Figure 1 
, we mainly used a computer with 2.80 GHz CPU (Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3840QM) and 8GB memory. The OS is Windows 8.1 Pro 64 bit, implementing in Magma V2.19-7. "Time" in Table 1 means the time which it took to compute the actual value of √ E(2 k ) for each 3 ≤ k ≤ 25. We note that, by applying Corollary 1 to the case of p = 2, we have
It is easy to compute exact values of E lower (k) and E upper (k) contrary to approximate values of √ E(2 k ). We calculated the approximate values of √ E(2 k ) up to k = 15 because of the limitations of our computer performance. For example, it took ten days to compute the approximate value of √ E(2 15 ) by our implementation in Magma. We stopped to draw values in Figure 1 for k ≥ 26 since the difference E upper (k) − E lower (k) is getting small for k ≥ 26.
Feedback to Hardness of SGP
By Cauchy-Schwalz's inequality
the success of the attack deeply depends on the size of ∥b ∨ j ∥ as in Section 4.2. Now by Figure 1 , we get that all E lower (k), ||b
and E upper (k) decrease monotoneously in k ≥ 6. In particular, the upper bound E upper (k) is rapidly decreasing, so is ∥b ∨ j ∥. Therefore, the success probability of Algorithm 1 for SGP is getting higher as k ≥ 6 increases. We will show our experimental results in Section 8, which suggest that it is sufficient for the success of Algorithm 1 to take k ≥ 10 for p = 2. The attack for the cryptosystems described in Section 3 is succeeded with probability almost being 1 for k ≥ 10. 
k with 3 ≤ k ≤ 25 (upper and lower bounds are given by Eupper(k) and E lower (k) respectively, "Time" means that the time which it took to compute the actual value of ∥b 
Experimental Verification
In this section, we give our experimental results to verify whether or not Algorithm 1 succeeds in recovering short elements g (or sufficiently small g's which can break cryptosystems described in Section 3).
We deal with the case of q = 2 k since our targeted cryptosystems [20, 27, 47] are basically constructed over 2 k -th cyclotomic fields. From the viewpoint of the efficiency of a key generation, encoding and decoding process in cryptosystems of [20, 27, 47] , we usually use k with 8 ≤ k ≤ 25 in practice. Our theoretical bounds in Subsection 7 allow us to infer that the success probability of Algorithm 1 gets higher as k is greater than 6. Thus, we show our experimental results of the success probability for each k with 6 ≤ k ≤ 10.
× /{±1} and R := Z[x]/(x n + 1).
Parameter Setting for Our Experiments
In order to analyze the security of our targeted cryptosystems [20, 27, 47] , we consider the following setting of the secret key g:
Choice of Distribution of Secret Key g We consider the case where g is randomly chosen from a discrete Gaussian distribution or a uniform distribution. Recall that g is chosen from a discrete Gaussian distribution in GGH and GGHLite schemes, and that g is uniformly chosen from a certain finite subset of Z[x] in FHE scheme (see Section 3). Size of Variance In GGH and GGHLite schemes, spaces of secret keys, that are discrete Gaussian distributions of the mean 0, depend only on their variances and n. (By contrast, in FHE scheme, the space of secret keys depends only on n). Thus, we consider whether the success probability of Algorithm 1 depends on variances of discrete Gaussian distributions by several experiments. Type of Principal Ideals I = (g) (Prime or Non-Prime) In FHE, GGH and GGHLite schemes, secret keys g ∈ R should be prime elements in R satisfying R/(g) ≃ F p for some prime number p. However, as we will note below, this condition can be relaxed in cases of GGH and GGHLite. (In addition, it may be also possible that the primality condition of g can be relaxed for FHE). Thus, we consider whether the success probability of Algorithm 1 depends on the primality of secret keys.
Effects of Primality and Variance
First, we consider effects of the primality of secret keys and variances of discrete Gaussian distributions. We divide this subsection into the cases of discrete Gaussian distributions and of uniformly distributions.
Case of Discrete Gaussian Distribution
First, we consider the case where secret keys g are chosen from discrete Gaussian distributions of the mean 0 and given standard deviations σ, which are spaces of secret keys of GGH and GGHLite schemes.
In each cryptosystem, a secret key g is a prime element in R such that N (g) := |Res(g ′ (x), x n + 1)| is a prime number, where g ′ is a polynomial in Z[x] representing g in R and Res(g ′ (x), x n + 1) is the resultant of g ′ and x n + 1. (The primality of N (g) is not a necessary condition but a sufficient condition that g is a prime element in R). The primality of g was used in the proof of [20, Lemmas 3 and 4] . In general, it is not efficient to obtain such g for large k, e.g. k ≥ 10 ([47, Section 7] , [3, Section 4] ). Fortunately, it is proved in [3] that the primality of g is not necessary to prove these lemmas, and thus the condition on g can be relaxed. Note that in [3] , it is suggested that the primality of g is still necessary for some cryptographic applications and it may be possible to attack by using the non-primality of g. Thus, we should experiment whether Algorithm 1 is one of such attacks.
Moreover, from Cramer et al.'s analysis for discrete Gaussian distributions [15, Lemma 5.6] , the success probability of Algorithm 1 seems to depend heavily on variances of discrete Gaussian distributions. From this, we should also experiment for several variances.
Before we show our experimental results, we recall from Sections 2 and 4 that the canonical generators of the group of cyclotomic units are
, and that we set b j := Log(b j ) as in (3) in Subsection 4.1. The vectors 1 := (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ R φ(q)/2 and b j 's are R-linearly independent, and thus they constitute an R-basis of R φ(q)/2 . Thus, for any g ∈ R, we have the following unique representation:
Note that we identify g ∈ R with the element in Z[ζ q ] by using the natural isomorphism R ≃ Z[ζ q ] in the above equation. It is easy to see { a
It implies that if we have |a j | < 1 2 for all j ∈ G ∖ {1}, then we can compute g by Algorithm 1.
The procedure for our experiment is as follows:
1. Construct the following three finite subsets of R
such that # SK i = 1000 for i = 1, 2, 3.
Compute b j and b
We use the same computer as in Section 7. We use the discrete Gaussian distribution sampler [2] , which is implemented in Sage by Martin Albrecht (also see [23] ). We implemented in Sage for the first step and implemented in Magma V2.19-7 for the second and the third steps. When i = 1 and i = 2, we computed the value of a ave (SK i ) only for k = 6, 7, 8, because of the difficulty of choosing many prime elements g ∈ R. In addition, we computed the value of a ave (SK 3 ) only for k = 9, 10.
In Table 2 , we show our experimental results on the value of a ave (SK i ) for i = 1, 2, 3. secret key g is a prime element in R chosen uniformly from the set 1, 2, . . . , N − 1) 
}
In our experiments, we use this method.
In this case, we also experiment whether the primality of g affects the success probability of Algorithm 1. Let SK 1 be the set of polynomials chosen by the above method. Let SK 2 be the set of polynomials f uniformly chosen from B(η) such that f mod (x n +1) does not generate a prime ideal for k = 6, 7, 8. We also choose g ∈ B(η) uniformly without testing the primality of g for k = 9, 10. Let SK 3 be the set of such polynomials. We choose g untill # SK 1 = # SK 2 = # SK 3 = 1000. For i = 1, 2, 3, set a ave (SK i ) as above.
In Table 3 , we show our experimental results on the value of a ave (SK i ) for i = 1, 2, 3. From Table 3 , we infer that the primality of g does not affect the difficulty of solving SGP for FHE scheme because of the same reason as in the case of discrete Gaussian distributions. Thus, we conclude that the security of FHE scheme against the RSG attack does not depend on the primality of secret keys, and that we can use non-prime elements g as secret keys if the condition on the primality is relaxed.
Success Probability of Algorithm 1
In the last of this section, we show our experimental results on the experimental success probability of Algorithm 1 for k = 6, 8, 10 and σ = 10 in both cases of discrete Gaussian distributions and uniformly distributions, where σ is the standard deviation of a discrete Gaussian distribution. We experimented 1000 times for each parameter. In Figures 2 and 3 , we show the value of max{|⟨Log(g), b
∨ j ⟩| | j ∈ G ∖ {1}} for each g. From Figures 2 and 3 , we infer that the probability that Algorithm 1 will succeed in recovering secret keys of FHE, GGH and GGHLite schemes with probability being about 50 % (resp. 85 % and 100 %) when k = 6 (resp. k = 8 and k = 10). In other words, the number of successes increases as k is larger. We believe that it is true for k > 10. Thus, our experimental results suggest that the security of FHE, GGH and GGHLite schemes depend heavily on the difficulty of solving the principal ideal problem. (resp. > 1 2 ). For each k, the secret key g is randomly generated by a discrete Gaussian distribution at 1, 000 times Fig. 3 . Same as Figure 2 , but g is generated by a uniformly random distribution
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the security of cryptosystems using short generators over ideal lattices against the RSG attack. We gave explicit estimates of the special values of Dirichlet L-functions at 1 for any non-trivial even Dirichlet characters modulo a prime power, and improved Cramer et al.'s main result verifying their attack by using our estimates. We also gave various experimental results. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest that breaking those cryptosystems can be reduced to solving the principal ideal problem, which is considered to be solved in quantum polynomial time. By all theorems described as above, it is well-known that h + (2 n ) = 1 holds true only for n ≤ 8.
The following three results below are concerned with the divisibility of h + (2 n ). All results as above give us that h + (2 n ) is huge for n ≥ 9 unless h + (2 n ) = 1.
